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As result of a recent amendment to the many times modified Hungarian Civil 
Code of 1959, namely due to the Act No. III of 2006 the distinction between 
the “bona fides” (hereinafter: b. f.) in the objective sense (to be understood as a 
requirement arising from the principle of good faith and fair dealing) on the 
one hand, and the so-called subjective b. f. (in terms of an error concerning the 
lawfulness of a legal situation) on the other hand has been rendered unambigu-
ous in Hungarian civil law by means of correction of the relating terminology.1 
This legislative correction of the Hungarian legal terminology was already 
maturing for more than a decade. In the Hungarian legal literature it was the 
late professor László Gáspárdy who — after the re-introduction of the principle 
of good faith and fair dealing in Hungarian civil law, namely after its substitu-
tion for the corresponding socialist principle by an mendment to the Civil 
Code in 1991 — first called attention to the fact that good faith as an objective 
system of requirements is not to be confused with the subjective good faith 
being present especially in the law of things.2 Since 2001 professor Lajos 
Vékás has emphasised several times the importance of th  distinction in ques-
                                                
* The present study — being at the same time a review about Il ruolo della buona fede ogget-
tiva nell’esperienza giuridica storica e contemporane . Atti del Convegno internazionale di 
studi in onore di Alberto Burdese [a cura di LUIGI GAROFALO], I—IV, Cedam, Padova 
2003, 578+578+608+581 pp. (and additional pages paginated with Roman numerals in the 
beginning of each volume) — has been written in the framework of the project OTKA K 
60756. The author owes thanks to Professors Gábor Hamza and Péter Takács as well as Dr 
Norbert Csizmazia for their useful advice. 
1 See §§ 2 and 5 in the Act No. III of 2006, which provided for the modification of § 4 and 
209/B of the Hungarian Civil Code (Act No. IV of 1959). The official motivation of the bill 
lays down expressis verbis: “The notion of jóhiszeműség és tisztesség (‘good faith and fair 
dealing’) represents an objective system of requirements that has an ethical colour, and it is 
not to be confused with the notion of the subjective jóhiszeműség (‘good faith’), which refers 
to a certain person’s state of mind and is relevant b sically in the law of things.” See Igazság-
ügyi Közlöny [= Official Journal of Ministry of Justice of Hungary] 2006/1, p. 258. In rela-
tion to the modification of § 209/B of the Hungarian Civil Code see also the fn. 48. 
2 L. GÁSPÁRDY in: F. Petrik (ed.), Polgári eljárásjog. Kommentár a gyakorlat számára [= 





tion.3 The Concept of the new Hungarian Civil Code, published as an attach-
ment to the Government Decision No. 1009/2002 (I. 31.) also called attention 
in a refined way to the fact that the principle of g od faith and fair dealing is 
not identical with good faith in the subjective sen. The Draft of the new Civil 
Code for Hungary published in 2006 reflects this dualistic approach to b. f. as 
well.4 
The dualistic concept of b. f. is for the German jurists as necessary as the dis-
tinction between law and right is a matter of course for the English jurists. Like 
in English language there is no overall term to designate both aspects of ius 
(droit, Recht, diritto, etc.), in German language an overall term to designate 
both aspects of bona fides (bonne foi, buona fede tc.) is missing. The dualistic 
concept of b. f. prevails also in many other legal systems, e. g. in Swiss, Italian 
and Dutch law being expressed by the relating terminology as well.5 
There are, however, a number of legal systems in whch various monistic con-
cepts prevail. The monistic concepts can be classified, grosso modo, into two 
groups, namely distinguishing the more traditional subjective monism and the 
more modern objective monism. Under the subjective monistic view b. f. is a 
homogeneous category and means always a subjective state of mind. This con-
cept prevails traditionally in French civil law and it is terminologically re-
flected by the uniform French term bonne foi.6 Also under the objective monis-
tic view b. f. is a homogeneous category but it always means an objective sys-
                                                
3 See e. g. L. VÉKÁS, in L. Vékás & M. Paschke (hrsg.), Europäisches Recht im ungarischen 
Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht, Münster 2004, p. 28, fn. 104. Even if with my modest means 
only, also I was striving to call attention to the dichotomy of b. f. and in this way to 
contribute to the spreading of the dualistic approach to b. f. in Hungarian legal thinking since 
1996, see A. FÖLDI & G. HAMZA, A római jog története és institúciói [= History and 
institutes of Roman law], Budapest 1996, marginal number 597; A. FÖLDI, Kereskedelmi 
jogintézmények a római jogban [= Commercial institutions in Roman law], Budapest 1997, 
242ff.; A. FÖLDI, A jóhiszeműség és tisztesség elve. Intézménytörténeti vázlat a róm i jog-
tól napjainkig [= The principle of good faith and fair dealing. An outline of its history from 
Roman law until our time], Budapest 2001, 118 p.; A. FÖLDI, A másért való felelősség a ró-
mai jogban [= Vicarious liability in Roman law], Budapest 2004, p. 229, fn. 1. 
4 “During the enforcement of rights and performance of duties the parties are obliged to act in 
accordance with the requirement of good faith and fair dealing”. See Polgári Törvénykönyv. 
Javaslat. Normaszöveg és indokolás [= Draft of a Civil ode for Hungary], Budapest 2006, § 
1: 3. See also the official motivation of § 5: 77 thereby. Nevertheless cp. fn. 64. 
5 As for the terminology, see the fn. 26. 
6 In the recent Italian literature G. MERUZZI, L’exceptio doli. Dal diritto civile al diritto 
commerciale, Padova 2005, 160 refers to the fact that pushing into the background and sub-
jectivisation of the bonne foi in France was due to the positivism and liberalism of the 19th 
century. This view has still strong position in thepr sent-day French legal thinking as well as 
in many Latin American legal systems, see R. CARDILLI, ‘Bona fides’ tra storia e sistema, 
Torino 2004, 67ff. See furthermore D. TALLON, Le con ept de bonne foi en droit français 
du contrat, Roma 1994. 
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tem of the requirements of fair dealing. This view is dominant in Austrian law 
and it is terminologically reflected by the uniform Austrian term Redlichkeit 
(‘honesty’).7 
These concepts of b. f. emerged since the middle of the 19th century, when 
some German pandectists realised the complexity of he b. f. Since the begin-
ning of the 20th century and especially in the last decades the spreading, or even 
the prevalence of the dualistic approach is observable in a number of legal 
systems.8 Nevertheless considerable arguments can be offered also for the ob-
jective monistic view prevailing in some contemporary legal systems (e. g. in 
Austrian law). As far as the subjective monistic con ept is concerned, it still 
exists in several legal systems, it seems, however, to be more and more weak-
ening and can surely be regarded as out of date. 
Due to the Act No. III of 2006 the view of those Hungarian jurists representing 
the subjective monistic approach to b. f. became de lege lata out of date.9 How-
ever, since it is not the legislation that decides about scientific truths, this re-
cent development of Hungarian legislation, which filled me otherwise with 
pleasure, inspired me to take in hand again the proceedings of the international 
conference on b. f. held in Padua in 2001, published in 2003, and to think 
newly about the questions of the monistic and dualistic approaches to b. f. In 
the present review I wish to expose the results of his meditation. 
The University of Padua, personally professor Luigi Garofalo and his col-
leagues organised an international scientific confere ce entitled “Il ruolo della 
buona fede oggettiva nell’esperienza giuridica storica e contemporanea”. The 
conference was held between the 14th and 16th of June 2001, in honour of the 
                                                
7 For the Austrian law see fn. 55. The distinction between the dualistic and monistic concepts 
as sketched above is of course only a rough reflection of a much more complex reality. I re-
fer hereby only to the fact that there are significant differences among the solutions of those 
legal systems accepting the dualistic approach to b. f. since the requirements for the rebuttal 
of the presumption of good faith are different, seemore thoroughly below (fn. 64). 
8 For the recent trend in Italian civil law towards the strenghening of objective b. f. — and in 
this way towards the weakening of the traditional subjective monism — see MERUZZI (cit. 
fn. 6), 165ff. For a similar tendency in Spanish law see M. HESSELINK, De redelijkheid en 
billijkheid in het Europese privaatrecht, Deventer 1999, p. 27, fn. 44. For the dualism mani-
festing itself in Chilean Código civil see CARDILLI (cit. fn. 6), 73ff. See furthermore K.
BALODIS, The role of the good faith principle in the contemporary civil law of Latvia, in: 
Law and Justice [Riga] 2003, 2ff. 
9 F. PETRIK in: F. Petrik (ed.), Polgári jog. Kommentár a gyakorlat számára [= Civil law. A 
Commentary for the practice], 2nd ed., Budapest 2002, I, 17f., representing the subjective 
monistic view, thinks that the expression “good faith and fair dealing” in § 4 of the Civil 
Code should not be a hendiadyoin but it should cover two different categories. In Petrik’s 
opinion the “good faith” should be also in the general clause in question a subjective element 





internationally renowned professor of Roman law in the University of Padua, 
Alberto Burdese. During the sessions, which took place on the first day in Pa-
dua, on the second day in Venice, and finally on the third day in Treviso, more 
than 70 papers were delivered altogether. The proceedings of the conference 
edited by Luigi Garofalo were published two years later and contain the written 
version of more than 80 papers by Italian, Spanish, German, Austrian, Swiss, 
Polish, Russian, Hungarian, Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean and Israeli romanists 
and civilists, as well as by some other Italian lega  scholars. The papers written 
mainly in Italian, furthermore in Spanish, English, German, French and Portu-
guese languages follow each other in alphabetical order of the authors’ names. 
The title or the subject of a scientific conference or a volume of papers respec-
tively usually do not involve a strict obligation for the participants to conform 
to the central topic.10 However, we can see with pleasure that the overwhelm-
ing majority of the papers in the “Atti Convegno Burdese” deals with the cen-
tral topic, namely with the (objective) b. f., or are closely related to it. The 
pleasing fact that there are also a few beautiful essays appreciating professor 
Alberto Burdese’s personality and work, does of course not affect the thematic 
unity of the volumes.11 A complete list of Alberto Burdese’s scientific publica-
tions can also be found in volume I (pp. 36—51).12 I do not wish to mention it 
                                                
10 Papers which are outside the central topic are as follows: G. HAMZA, Did private 
international law exist in the “Imperium Romanum”? (Reflections on a “vexata quaestio”), 
vol. II, 323—331; R. LAMBERTINI, Lucrativa usucapio, vol. II, 365—376; P. ZILIOTTO, 
Vendita con ‘lex commissoria’ o ‘in diem addictio’: la portata dell’espressione ‘res inempta’, 
vol. IV, 475—515; J. ZLINSZKY, Konzept mit Begründung zum Kapitel des ungarischen 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches über zivilrechtliche Haftung, vol. IV, 517—539. Although the 
paper of C. VENTURINI, ‘Bis idem exigere’ e ‘corruptio servi’: un’ipotesi particolare, vol. 
IV, 403—437, begins with a passage from Gaius refering to b. f. (D. 50.17.57), it is linked to 
the subject matter only in a wider sense. The paper of J. GARCÍA SÁNCHEZ, La buona fede 
negli articoli 375 e 379 del Codice civile spagnolo, v l. II, 203—239 written in Spanish 
language (in spite of the Italian title) is dealing mainly with the role subjective b. f. plays in 
some Spanish rules concerning the acquisition of ownership (there is also an outlook to 
Roman law, see p. 233, fn. 80). Strictly speaking the papers by VÖLKL and ZANNINI are 
also outside the thematic scope of the conference but they chose their topic on the basis of an 
objective monistic approach to b. f., see fn. 40 and 56 respectively. 
11 G. MARCHESINI, Saluto inaugurale, vol. I, 5―6; L. LABRUNA, Libertà e autonomia 
nell’Università. Lettera ad Alberto Burdese, vol. I, 7―10; A. GRECO, Il nostro preside 
Alberto Burdese, vol. I, 11―12; S. ROMANO, Anno accademico 1943-44: Alberto Burdese 
matricola della facoltà torinese di giurisprudenza, vol. I, 13―25; L. GAROFALO, Alberto 
Burdese: tratti di un Maestro (e suoi scritti), vol. I, 27―35; F. P. CASAVOLA, Per Alberto 
Burdese, vol. I, 57―59; D. DE POLI, Alberto Burdese e la facoltà giuridica ptavina a 
Treviso, vol. I, 137―138. Professor BURDESE’s grateful words can be read at the end of 
the last volume (Ringraziamenti, vol. IV, 579―581). 
12 The list begins with a treatise published in 1948 (A. BURDESE, La menzione degli eredi 
nella ‘fiducia cum creditore’, Studi in onore di S. olazzi, Napoli 1948), and ends with those 
works of the master of Padua which were still in press in 2001. 
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critically but it would have been undoubtedly very useful to provide the beauti-
ful and substantial volumes also with an index of sources. 
Within the present review I cannot undertake to make known the extremely 
rich content of the four volumes amounting to about 2400 pages altogether, not 
even in outline. What I wish to show hereinafter is basically just one aspect: 
how the individual authors opine about the dualism of “buona fede oggettiva” 
and “buona fede soggettiva”.13 Although this dualism is suggested also by the 
title of the volumes under review, it is very far from being unproblematic. 
The history of the development of this distinction s an interesting question also 
in itself, however, surprisingly little is known orat least reflected about it even 
by those researchers dealing with b. f.14 The attributes “objective” and “subjec-
tive” are not often attached to the term b. f. either in Roman law or in civil law 
literature. Nevertheless their appearance might cause certain misunderstand-
ings.15 The attentive reader can notice some signs of this problem even in the 
proceedings of the conference in Padua. Thus the choice of the topic of the 
conference cannot be regarded as banal at all. The topic of the volumes edited 
by Luigi Garofalo constitutes much rather a scientific challenge. The subject-
matter is namely a modern and at the same time a problematical category of 
                                                
13 Even if I did not have the opportunity to add meritory remarks to all of the papers included in 
the four volumes, the reader will find the bibliographic data (author’s name, title of the study, 
number of the relating volume and of the pages) of each of the papers in the footnotes below, 
as a matter of course without a repeated indicating of the title of the proceedings. 
14 This fact is especially strange if we consider that e recent Roman law (as well as civil law) 
literature of b. f. is immense (“eine unüberschaubare Literatur”, as ascertained by D NÖRR, 
Römisches Recht: Geschichte und Geschichten, München 2005, 13). To list only a few of the 
relevant works published since the publication of the proceedings of the conference in Padua, 
see CARDILLI (cit. fn. 6); E. STOLFI, Bonae fidei interpretatio, Napoli 2004 (with a short 
reference to Zannini’s view accepting it, p. 8, fn. 12); L. GAROFALO (cur.), L’eccezione di 
dolo generale. Diritto romano e tradizione romanistica, Padova 2006; CH. KRAFT, “Bona 
fides” als Voraussetzung für den Eigentumserwerb durch “specificatio” TR 74 (2006), 
289ff.; A. METRO, ‘Exceptio doli’ e ‘iudicia bonae fidei’, to be published in Studi in memo-
ria di Gennaro Franciosi, see www.unipa.it/~dipstdir/pub/annali/2006/Metro.pdf. The prob-
lem of distinction between the objective and the subjective b. f. is thoroughly dealt with, 
however, by A. SÖLLNER, “Bona fides” ― guter Glaube?, SZ 122 (2005), 1ff. As to the re-
cent civil law literature on the b. f., see e. g. the bibliography by F. RANIERI, Europäisches 
Obligationenrecht, 2nd ed. 2003, 663; see more recently CARDILLI (cit. fn. 6); GAROFALO 
(cit. in this fn.); R. FIORI, Bona fides. Formazione, esecuzione e interpretazione del contratto 
nella tradizione civilistica, parte prima, in: Modelli teorici e metodologici nella storia del 
diritto privato, II, Napoli 2006, 127ff. See also J. PICO I YUNOI, El principio de la buena fe 
procesal, Barcelona 2003. In the recent civil law literature it is e. g. MERUZZI (cit. fn. 6), 
176ff. who deals with the problem of the distinction in question more thoroughly than many 
other authors do. An exceptionally clear but at the same time somewhat exaggerated dualism 
manifests itself in the study of BALODIS (cit. fn. 8), 2ff. 
15 The question in the title of a study by R. SACCO, Cos’è la buona fede oggettiva? (in: Il 





civil law dogmatics which encourages us to carry out research in the field of 
the comparative history of legal dogmatics. In any case I deem it reasonable to 
briefly sum up first of all these problems, and so to start by laying down certain 
premises for the present review. 
The original Roman category of fides, as pointed out already by Bruns and 
Fraenkel,16 had nothing to do with the subjective belief of a person. Fides 
meant originally much rather ‘truthfulness’ and thus ‘honesty’. The fundamen-
tal meaning of the word had therefore an objective and ethical colour. This 
objective meaning was completely in accordance with the application of the 
term fides bona in the formulae of the praetorian bonae fidei iudicia. In this 
way a certain kind of “b. f. of the law of obligations” was developed in pre-
classical Roman law.17 Later, however, as the b. f. of the possessor came into 
prominence, it became possible to regard the b. f. in this respect as a more or 
less subjective requirement (e. g. as an error concerning the lawfulness of pos-
session), and many passages in the sources (e. g. Gai. Inst. 2.43, Paul. 
D.18.1.27) point to that, indeed.18 A diffused view in the contemporary Roman 
law literature (e. g. Hausmaninger) holds that the subjective approach to the 
possessor’s b. f. is traceable already in the classical Roman law,19 hereas 
some authors, e. g. Söllner think that it did not take place even in the law of 
Justinian.20 Anyway, no contradistinction between the subjective b. f. (“of the 
                                                
16 C. G. BRUNS, Das Wesen der “bona fides” bei der Ersitzung, Berlin 1872, especially 78ff.; 
E. FRAENKEL, Zur Geschichte des Wortes “fides”, Rheinisches Museum 71 (1916), 187ff. 
17 It is worth mentioning that Cicero sometimes also referred to iudicia de mala fide (Nat. d. 
3.30.74), see C. A. CANNATA, ‘Bona fides’ e strutture processuali, vol. I, 257―273; see on 
this particular point p. 272. 
18 An exhaustive list of the passages in the sources of Roman law concerning the b. f. in the 
subjective sense can be found in the proceedings of the conference, see namely M. 
TALAMANCA, La ‘bona fides’ nei giuristi romani: «Leerformeln» e valori dell’ordinamento, 
vol. IV, 1—312, see in this respect p. 246, fn. 674, p. 247, fn. 676, p. 248, fn. 678. 
19 H. HAUSMANINGER, Die “bona fides” des Ersitzungsbeitzers im klassischen römischen 
Recht, Wien 1964. See similarly H. HAUSMANINGER & W. SELB, Römisches Privat-
recht, 9th ed. 2001, 155f. The subjective interpretation of b. f. in the context of usucaption is 
reflected also in the recent German translations of the sources making use of the expressions 
guter Glaube or gutgläubig instead of Treu und Glauben (or gute Treue, as suggested, with 
reference to KASER, by M. J. SCHERMAIER, “Bona fides” im römischen Vertragsrecht, 
vol. III, 387—416, see on this particular point p. 390, fn. 13), see U. MANTHE (hrsg.), 
Gaius, Institutiones, Darmstadt 2004, 127 (Gai. 2.42); O. BEHRENDS, R. KNÜTEL, B. 
KUPISCH & H.-H. SEILER (hrsg.), Corpus iuris civilis. Text und Übersetzung, vol. I, 2nd 
ed., Heidelberg 1997, 65ff. (Inst. 2.6). 
20 SÖLLNER (cit. fn. 14) thinks that the b. f. is mentioned in the sources always in the 
objective sense even in the context of usucaption, e. g. the bonae fidei emptor in the sources 
should be understood as a buyer who obtained a res mancipi through informal emptio 
venditio (that is a bonae fidei contractus) instead of mancipatio. Söllner’s objective monistic 
view is not entirely new, see namely Bruns’ similar theory (cit. fn. 16). Söllner could visibly 
not to take into consideration the proceedings of the conference in Padua. Söllner’s view is 
REMARKS ON THE NOTION OF “BONA FIDES” 59 
law of things”) and the objective b. f. (“of the law of obligations”) can be found 
in the sources of Roman law, which is forewarning. 
It was in accordance with the sources of Roman law that in the literature of ius 
commune a not yet deliberate monistic approach to b. f. prevailed. A trend in 
the direction of subjectivisation in the interpretation of the content of b. f. 
seems to be likely in the Middle Ages also because the word fides meant, as a 
result of Christian influence, since the late antiqui y mainly ‘belief’, and the 
equivalent expressions in the vernaculars (buona fede, bonne foi, buena fe, 
guter Glaube) could have strengthened this latter meaning.21 Disregarding the 
appearance of the German term Treu und Glauben as the translation of the ob-
jective b. f. in the 16th century22 as well as some sporadic remarks in this re-
spect in the 18th century,23 the contradistinction between the objective and sub-
jective b. f. emerged just in the second half of the 19th century, namely in the 
German pandectistic literature. Bruns and Wächter described expressis verbis 
the difference between the psychological and ethical aspects of b. f. for the first 
time. While Bruns elaborated an objective monistic approach to b. f. (under 
which b. f. always appears as an ethical criterion, even in the case of the usu-
caption, whereas the subjective b. f. of a person is just a fact required by the 
ethical principle of the b. f.),24 Wächter distinguished clearly between the “psy-
chological” b. f. (called also “subjective” already by him), which plays a part in 
the case of usucaption on the one hand, and the ethical b. f. (“of the law of ob-
ligations”) on the other.25 
                                                                                                             
accepted by J. D. HARKE, “Liber homo bona fides serviens” und Vertragsgeltung, RIDA 52 
(2005), 164. 
21 Nevertheless the results of R. RODRÍGUEZ LÓPEZ’s research (La ‘bona fides’ en los textos 
cristianos, vol. III, 255―277) speak against this assumption. 
22 Cp. A. ERLER, Treu und Glauben, HRG, vol. V (1998), 319; R. MEYER, “Bona fides” und 
“lex mercatoria” in der europäischen Rechtstradition, Göttingen 1994, 64ff. 
23 CH. MEISTER, De fide eiusque iure in usucapione et praescriptione, Gottingae 1741; S. 
HUSZTY, Jurisprudentia practica, Tyrnaviae 1766, vol. II, p. 14. The analytical approach in 
these works can be explained with the authors’ natural law way of thinking. 
24 BRUNS (cit. fn. 16), especially p. 98. 
25 C. G. VON WÄCHTER, Die “bona fides” insbesondere beid r Ersitzung des Eigenthums, 
Leipzig 1871, see especially p. 59. As a forerunner of this theory is rated mainly R. VON 
STINTZING, Das Wesen von “bona fides” und “titulus” in der römischen Usucapionslehre, 
Heidelberg 1852, 120f., who thought that the “bona fides” of the unlawful possessor was 
negative (so identified it with ignorance), unlike C. A. MÖLLENTHIEL’s view (being a pio-
neer in his time as regards the more thorough analysis of b. f.), Über die Natur des guten 





Wächter’s dualistic theory could later become prevailing i Germany (and in 
Switzerland, too) also because of the fact that in the BGB (as well as in the 
German version of the Swiss ZGB) subjective and objective b. f. are designated 
with different and consistently applied terms (guter Glaube and Treu und 
Glauben respectively). This dualistic approach to b. f. became more and more 
widespread in the 20th century, and in some countries it led also de lege lata to 
terminological modifications.26 
The organisers of the conference in Padua obviously chose the title of it con-
sidering the premise according to which there are two aspects of b. f., as it is 
recognised also by a number of authors in the recent Italian civil law litera-
ture.27 It is, however, difficult to say, whether the authors of the papers in-
cluded in the volumes under review accept the distinction between the objec-
tive and the subjective b. f. In a significant part of the papers certain specific 
problems connected to b. f. are scrutinised, while the theoretical question, 
whether considering b. f. a homogeneous or a duplex category is right is not 
dealt with. As regards those authors who face the complexity of the category of 
b. f., and sometimes analyse this problem more thoroughly, we can meet not 
negligible differences among their views. 
A significant part of the authors dealing partly or fully with ancient (classical) 
Roman law — it is remarkable, that there are some of today’s leading roman-
ists among them — considers b. f. without any scruples as an objective cate-
gory, and not only ignores the dualistic approach but does not refer at all to the 
                                                
26 In Italian legal terminology, in order to designate the objective b. f., the expression corret-
tezza (e buona fede) introduced by the Codice civile of 1942 is used (even if not consistently) 
instead of the traditional expression buona fede meaning first of all the subjective good faith, 
cp. MERUZZI (cit. fn. 6), 165ff. The new Dutch BW introduced for objective b. f. the term 
redelijkheid en billijkheid substituting it for the traditional term goude trouw, cp. e. g. H. 
ANKUM, Römisches Recht im neuen niederländischen Bürgerlich n Gesetzbuch, in: 
Rechtsgeschichte und Privatrechtsdogmatik (ed. R. Zimmer ann et al.), Heidelberg 2000, 
110. Unfortunately it is not clear, not even in the light of Dutch legal literature (see e. g. 
HESSELINK [cit. fn. 8]), where this expression deriv s from. The (at least formally) 
equivalent German term “Redlichkeit und Billigkeit” occurs sometimes in the pandectists’ 
works, see e. g. H. DERNBURG, Pandekten, 6th ed. Berlin 1900, I. 1, 303. For a similar 
modification of the Hungarian legal terminology in 2006 see the introductory part of the pre-
sent study. Also in the Latvian Civillikum there is an — even if not very striking — termino-
logical distinction between the objective b. f. (laba ticiba in Art. 1) and the subjective b. f. 
(labticiba in Art. 1065), see BALODIS (cit. fn. 8), p. 4. 
27 See G. GIAMPICCOLO, La buona fede in senso soggettivo nel sistema di diritto privato, in: 
Studi sulla buona fede, Milano 1975, 79; F. D. BUSNELLI, Buona fede in senso soggettivo e 
responsabilità per fatto «ingiusto», ibidem, 567; A. TRABUCCHI, Istituzioni di diritto civile, 
40th ed. Padova 2001, p. 481, fn. 1. 
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different meanings of b. f. revealing themselves in the sources of Roman law.28 
Also Antonio Fernández de Buján belongs to these authors but he gives a more 
tinged description, so far as he points out that the fitting of the attribute bona to 
the word fides resulted in the objectivisation of the term.29 Also Ana Aleman 
Monterreal regards the b. f. as a homogeneous objective category but she as-
certains in this respect some historical development in the direction of trans-
cending the seller’s liability beyond the dolus.30 
A few romanists, who belong typically to the somewhat younger generation of 
today’s romanists, apply the distinction between the objective and the subjec-
tive b. f. also in relation to the ancient (classical) Roman law, without entering 
into the problem of this distinction.31 
                                                
28 H. ANKUM, Il ‘beneficium cedendarum actionum’ del mandante di credito: un beneficio 
basato sulla buona fede nel diritto romano classico, vol. I, 173—188; C. A. CANNATA, 
‘Bona fides’ e strutture processuali, vol. I, 257—273; F. GALLO, ‘Bona fides’ e ‘ius 
gentium’, vol. II, 115—153; F. GORIA, ‘Bona fides’ ed ‘actio ex stipulatu’ per la 
restituzione della dote: legislazione giustinianea e precedenti classici, vol. II, 241—263; A. 
GUARINO, Il gusto dell’esegesi: D. 19, 1, 50, vol. II, 265—271; P. LAMBRINI, ‘Fundum 
Cornelianum stipulatus quanti fundus est postea stipulor’: novazione oggettiva ed eccezione 
di dolo in diminuzione della condanna, vol. II, 377—395; F. LONGCHAMPS DE BÉRIER, 
La buona fede ‘mortis causa’? Le disposizioni ‘poenae nomine’ e la ‘querela inofficiosi 
testamenti’, vol. II, 397—415; J. PARICIO, Apuntes sobre la ‘actio fiduciae’, vol. III, 49—
57, G. SANTUCCI, ‘Fides bona’ e ‘societas’: una riflessione, vol. III, 359—385; A. 
RODEGHIERO, D. 18, 1, 34, 3: vendita di ‘res furtiva’ e principio di buona fede, vol. III, 
235—254; SCHERMAIER (cit. fn. 19), vol. III, 387—416 (the English version of this study 
was already published before in: R. Zimmermann & S. Whittaker [ed.], Good faith in 
European contract law, Cambridge 2000); S. TAFARO, Buona fede ed equilibrio degli 
interessi nei contratti, vol. III, 567—608; L. VACCA, Buona fede e sinallagma contrattuale, 
vol. IV, 331—351; J. ZABŁOCKI, ‘Ex fide bona’ nella formula del comodato, vol. IV, 
453—463; M. G. ZOZ, Il ruolo della buona fede nel contratto di trasporto marittimo, vol. IV, 
541—562. In this group of papers can be mentioned th  s udy by E. CANTARELLA, Regole 
di correttezza in materia contrattuale nel mondo greco, vol. I, 275—281. 
29 A. FERNÁNDEZ DE BUJÁN, De ‘los arbitria bonae fidei’ pretorios a los ‘iudicia bonae 
fidei’ civiles, vol. II, 31—58, see especially p. 46. 
30 A. ALEMAN MONTERREAL, La incidencia de la ‘bona fides’ en el ‘quantum’ 
indemnizatorio: a proposito de la responsabilidad del vendedor per los vicios o defectos 
ocultos, vol. I, 141—153. The author shows the continuity of the Roman rules of warranty 
relating to the quality of goods in modern Spanish law as well. 
31 M. V. SANSÓN RODRÍGUEZ, La buena fe en el ejercicio de los derechos y en el 
cumplimiento de las obligaciones desde la perspectiva del derecho privado romano, vol. III, 
293—358 refers to the passage Gai 2.43 as a proof of the existence of the distinction between 
the objective and the subjective b. f. in classical Roman law (p. 294). The authors making use 
of the attributes “objective” and “subjective” also with respect to the b. f. of Roman law are 
as follows: D. DOZHDEV, “Fidem emptoris sequi”: Good faith and price payment in the 
structure of the Roman classical sale, vol. I, 551—578; P. GARBARINO, Brevi osservazioni 
in tema di azioni di buona fede in diritto giustinia eo, vol. II, 191—202; V. MANNINO, 





There are also authors examining the complexity of the Roman notion of the 
b. f. more thoroughly. Some of them point out that the distinction between the 
objective and the subjective b. f. is a schematic simplification of the much more 
complicated reality but the image given by them is not always clear enough.32 
Wojciech Dajczak’s paper shows a likewise careful approach. The Polish ro-
manist states that the term b. f. had more meanings already in the preclassic 
age, and since Cato maior it has been used also in the context of a person’s 
state of mind. Dajczak visibly avoids to refer to the roots of an isolation of the 
subjective b. f. in this respect.33 
In relation to the classical law clearer assumptions are allowed. Accordingly, 
e. g. Antonio Díaz Bautista ssumes that since the age of Hadrian the term b. f. 
may have been used by the Roman jurists as a pronounced antonym of mala 
fides, thus in the subjective sense (as “credenza possessoria”).34 Aloísio Surgík, 
however, ascribes the application of the term b. f. in the subjective sense to the 
law of Justinian.35 
                                                                                                             
criterio della buona fede e risarcibilità del danno conseguente: brevi profili romanistici, vol. 
III, 27—48 (also with regard to modern law); A. PETRUCCI, ‘Neque enim decipi debent 
contrahentes’. Appunti sulla tutela dei contraenti con un’impresa nel diritto romano 
tardorepubblicano e del principato, vol. III, 89—103; P. PICHONNAZ, Quelques aspects de 
la bonne foi (objective) dans la compensation en cas de faillite à Rome et aujourd’hui, vol. 
III, 105—123; L. SALOMÓN SANCHO, El concepto de buena fe en las Instituciones de 
Gayo. En concreto Gai 2, 51, vol. III, 279—292; A. TRISCIUOGLIO, ‘Bona fides’ e 
locazioni pubbliche nelle ‘opiniones’ di Ulpiano, vol. IV, 313—330. 
32 A. BIGNARDI, Brevi considerazioni sulla funzione della buona fede nell’ ‘usucapio’, in 
particolare nel pensiero di Paolo, vol. I, 207—224; R. CARDILLI, La «buona fede» come 
principio di diritto dei contratti. Diritto romano e America Latina, vol. I, 283—369. While 
analysing the content of b. f. in Roman law, Cardilli does not use the attributes “objective” 
and “subjective” but with respect to the modern (mainly Latin American) legal systems 
examined by him, he does. The Italian author has recently published the results of his 
research in a book as well (cit. fn. 6). 
33 W. DAJCZAK, La libertà di applicazione della clausola generale della buona fede: 
osservazioni sulla prospettiva del diritto romano, v l. I, 409—427, see especially p. 416 with 
a reference to Cato agr. 14.3. The Polish romanist is an internationally acknowledged expert 
of the problems of b. f., see comprehensively his monograph Zwrot ‘bona fides’ w 
rozstrzygnięciach dotyczących kontraktów u pravników rzymskich okresu klasycznego, 
Toruń 1998, 184, with a summary in English. A partly similar approach is characteristic of 
the paper of E. OSABA (‘Fides’ y ‘bona fides’ en la ‘Lex Visigothorum’, vol. II, 543—578), 
who states that in the Lex Visigothorum the objective and the subjective b. f. cannot be 
isolated as clearly as in modern legal systems (p. 565). 
34 A. DÍAZ BAUTISTA, La buona fede nel senatoconsulto Giuvenziano, vol. I, 489—503 
(with an interesting quantitative analysis of the wordings at relevant passages in the sources); 
similarly SANSÓN RODRÍGUEZ (cit. fn. 31), vol. III, 294. 
35 A. SURGÍK, Da necessidade da boa-fé objetiva na ética profissional do advogado, vol. III, 
541—566, see especially p. 547. 
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Mario Talamanca’s monographic treatise deserves special attention also as 
constituting a book within the book, so far as this work of 312 pages amounts 
to more than the half of the extent of volume IV.36 Apparently, professor Tala-
manca realised just during the completion of this treatise the fact, how much 
the distinction between the objective and the subjectiv  b. f. is missing from the 
textbooks and manuals of both Roman law and civil law, like most contempo-
rary romanists and civilists seem not to be fully aware of this distinction.37 On 
the basis of this recognition Talamanca criticises Kaser’s famous Handbuch 
referring to the fact that Kaser did not see any difference between the posses-
sor’s b. f. and the b. f. in the bonae fidei iudicia.38 However, we have to remark 
at this point that Kaser considered the b. f. on the basis of the objective monis-
tic view which prevails not only in Austrian law but which can also be a plau-
sible way of approach when researching the b. f. of Roman law. Under this 
view the b. f. of the bonae fidei possessor does not mean that kind of subjective 
b. f. which may arise even from a hardly founded mistake but much rather the 
well founded persuasion of a person acting with immaculate diligence, al-
though mistaken in the particular case.39 
The title of the conference in Padua gave not only professor Talamanca plenty 
to think about but in some respects it deceived other participants as well. In this 
way Pierluigi Zannini today admits not having noticed for a long while that the 
organisers chose as topic not the b. f. in general but the objective b. f. only. 
Starting from this “assumption in good faith”, professor Zannini delivered in 
the conference a paper about b. f. as a requirement of usucaption. In his paper 
published in the proceedings of the conference the Italian romanist ascertains 
that he did not make such a big mistake when choosing the topic mentioned 
since Roman law did not isolate the objective and the subjective b. f. as ex-
pressly as the modern dualistic theory does. Moreover, according to Zannini, in 
order to avoid an exaggerated schematism it can be highly recommended to 
                                                
36 TALAMANCA (cit. fn. 18), vol. IV, 1—312. 
37 TALAMANCA (cit. fn. 18), vol. IV, p. 9, fn. 24 mentions self-critically also his own text-
book (Istituzioni di diritto romano, Milano 1990) among the modern Roman and civil law 
textbooks and manuals which do not oppose the objective and the subjective b. f. to each 
other. 
38 See TALAMANCA (cit. fn. 18), vol. IV, p. 9, fn. 24. As to the description of the possessor’s 
b. f. by KASER, Das römische Privatrecht, vol. I, 2nd ed. München 1971, 422f., Talamanca 
says that “non si può negare che colpisce la mancanza di qualsiasi riflessione sull’innegabile 
diversa struttura della bona fides nei due casi di applicazione”. Nevertheless Talamanca does 
not prefer a schematic dualism. The great Italian romanist ascertains e. g. (pp. 244ff.) that 
Ulpian in the passage in D. 18, 6, 1, 3 did not refer ither to the objective or to the subjective 
b. f. but to a kind of “bona fide agere”.  
39 As to the Austrian concept of Redlichkeit, see fn. 55f. KASER’s view as regards the b. f. of 
the Roman law seems to be somewhat different as compared with SÖLLNER’s (cit. fn. 14) 





modern jurists, who prefer the dualistic approach to b. f., to regard the experi-
ence of the sources of Roman law or simply the famous warning by Talleyrand 
(“et surtout … pas de zèle”).40 
Still stuck to the papers dealing with Roman law, Alfredo di Pietro’s view ne-
cessarily strikes the eye, who asserts, referring to Meillet’s etymological re-
search, that fides is a substantive derived from the verb credo, and he also as-
sumes a close semantical connection between the two words.41 In relation to 
this highly problematical assumption it is worth pointing out among others that 
neither Leonid Kofanov, nor Francesco Sini, analysing the roots of fides in 
terms of the history of religion, have found any correlation between the Roman 
fides and the notion of belief.42 It is not less important to consider in this re-
spect that Remo Martini and Dieter Nörr, examining the relations between the 
Roman fides and the Greek pistis, deem in this respect not the subjective 
meaning of pistis (‘belief’) relevant but its objective, ethical meaning.43 I re-
mark at this point that as it emerges from the paper of Rosalía Rodríguez 
López, the subjectivisation of the meaning of b. f. was not carried out in the 
Christian literature of the Antiquity and of the Middle Ages, either.44 
As regards the papers dealing with modern law, the authors usually refer to the 
fact that they are not concerned with b. f. in general but with the objective b. f. 
only (or with equity or the misuse of rights); several authors also stress the 
difference between the objective and the subjective b. f.45 A few authors treat 
                                                
40 P. ZANNINI, Sulle tracce del concetto di buona fede, D. 41, 7, 5 pr., vol. IV, 465—473. 
41 A. DI PIETRO, La ‘fides’ pubblica romana, vol. I, 50 —549, see especially pp. 543f. (the 
text of this paper is in Spanish language). L. GUTIÉRREZ-MASSON, Actos propios y buena 
fe. En torno a Papiniano 3 quaestionum D. 50, 17, 25, vol. II, 273—292, assumes expressly 
an “equivalencia fides—credo” (p. 275), nota bene, he is doing it without any support or re-
ference. 
42 L. KOFANOV, Il carattere religioso-giuridico della ‘fides’ romana nei secoli V-III a. C.: 
sull’interpretazione di Polibio 6, 56, 6-15, vol. II, 333—345; F. SINI, ‘Fetiales, quod fidei 
publicae inter populos praeerant’: riflessioni su ‘fides’ e «diritto internazionale» romano (a 
proposito di ‘bellum’, ‘hostis’, ‘pax’), vol. III, 481—539. 
43 R. MARTINI, ‘Fides’ e ‘pistis’ in materia contrattuale, vol. II, 439—449; D. NÖRR, “Fides 
Punica” – “fides Romana”. Bemerkungen zur “demosia pistis” im ersten karthagisch-
römischen Vertrag und zur Rechtsstellung der Fremden in der Antike, vol. II, 47—541. As 
regards the etymology Nörr emphasises that “es abwegig wäre, sich etwa mit Hilfe von Ety-
mologien auf die Suche nach einer in dieser Epoche noch fassbaren «ursprünglichen» Be-
deutung der fides zu machen” (p. 538). Cp. D. NÖRR, Aspekte des römischen Völkerrechts, 
München 1989, as well as his “Fides” im römischen Völkerrecht, Heidelberg 1991. 
44 R. RODRÍGUEZ LÓPEZ (cit. fn. 21), vol. III, 255―277. 
45 G. ALPA, La buona fede integrativa: note sull’andamento parabolico delle clausole generali, 
vol. I, 155—172; A. FÖLDI, Rinascita del principio della buona fede oggettiva in Ungheria, 
vol. II, 59—98; A. FUSARO, Il ruolo della buona fede oggettiva nel diritto delle 
associazioni, vol. II, 99—114; P. GALLO, Buona fede oggettiva e trasformazioni del 
contratto, vol. II, 155—189; K. LUIG, Il ruolo della buona fede nella giurisprudenza della 
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the questions of b. f. both in the objective and in the subjective sense; they dis-
tinguish clearly between the two categories.46 B. f. in the objective and in the 
subjective sense are opposed to each other in a highly suggestive way in the 
paper by Anna de Vita, who points out that objective b. f. sounds almost ear-
splitting for English lawyers since good faith means for them a subjective crite-
rion.47 
                                                                                                             
Corte dell’Impero prima e dopo l’entrata in vigore dl BGB dell’anno 1900, vol. II, 417—
424; A. PERULLI, La buona fede nel diritto del lavoro, vol. III, 65—87; P. RESCIGNO, 
Rimeditazioni sulla buona fede. Omaggio ad Alberto Burdese, vol. IV, 565—577. Some Ita-
lian authors do not speak explicitly about “buona fede oggettiva” but applying the clearer 
Italian technical term correttezza e buona fede they hint at the fact that they deal with the 
objective b. f., see T. DALLA MASSARA, Frazionabilità della domanda e principo di buona 
fede, vol. I, 429—457; F. MERUSI, Buona fede e affidamento nel diritto pubblico: il caso 
dell’«alternanza», vol. II, 451—465; P. M. VECCHI, Buona fede e relazioni successive 
all’esecuzione del rapporto obbligatorio, vol. IV, 353—401. The German phraseology of the 
paper by B. KUPISCH, “Bona fides” und Bürgschaft auf erst s Anfordern. Zu einer Ent-
scheidung aus der jüngsten Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes (BGH) zum Rechts-
missbrauch, vol. II, 347—364 also manifests that the author deals with the objective b. f. 
(Treu und Glauben). The following papers belong mutatis mundis also to this group: R. 
FAVALE, Nullità del contratto per difetto di forma e buona fede, vol. II, 1—30; F. NAPPI, 
Buona fede ed equità nell’estinzione dell’obbligazione per compensazione (Considerazioni 
sulla funzione di garanzia della compensazione), vol. II, 475—495; A. PALAZZO, Promesse 
gratuite e affidamento, vol. III, 1—25 (looking back also upon Roman law); S. SCHIPANI, 
Principi e regole per il debito internazionale dei paesi in via di sviluppo. La prospettiva 
romanistico-civilistica, vol. III, 417—458; P. SCHLESINGER, Invalidità di deliberazioni 
assembleari nelle società di capitali per «abuso» del diritto di voto?, vol. III, 459—469. 
46 G. A. BENACCHIO, La buona fede nel diritto comunitario, vol. I, 189—200; A. GUZMÁN, 
La buena fe en el Código civil de Chile, vol. II, 293— 21 (looking back also upon Roman 
law); F. G. SCOCA, Tutela giurisdizionale e comportamento della pubblica amministrazione 
contrario alla buona fede, vol. III, 471—480. 
47 A. DE VITA, Buona fede e common law. Attrazione non fatale nella storia del contratto, vol. 
I, 459—487. Cp. F. D. BUSNELLI, Note in tema di buona fede ed equità, vol. I, 225—255, 
see especially p. 246. As for the subjective sense of good faith in English law, see 
furthermore R. GOODE, The concept of good faith in English law, Roma 1992, 4. This is not 
the case, however, as regards the English Sale of Go ds Act (1893), art. 62 (b) or the 
American Uniform Commercial Code, art. 2, 103, where good faith is an objective criterion, 
see A. M. RABELLO, Buona fede e responsabilità precontrattuale nel diritto israeliano alla 
luce del diritto comparativo, vol. III, 125—227, see in this respect pp. 135 and 148. As for 
the traditional reservations of English jurists about good faith in the objective sense, see J. 
BEATSON, The incorporation of the EC Directive on Unfair Consumer Contracts in English 
law, ZeuP 4/1998, 958ff.; G. TEUBNER, Legal irritants: Good faith in British law or How 
unifying law ends up in new divergences, The Modern Law Review 61 (1998), 11ff.; E. 
MCKENDRICK, Good faith: a matter of principle?, in: A.D. M. Forte (ed.), Good faith in 
contract and property law, Oxford 1999, 44ff; R. BROWNSWORD, Two concepts of good 
faith, Journal of Contract Law 7 (1994), 198. For the reception of the objective good faith in 
English law see H. MACQUEEN, Good faith in the Scots law of contract: An undisclosed 
principle?, in Forte, op. cit., 5; BROWNSWORD (cit. in this fn.), 200ff; MCKENDRICK 





More Italian civilists throw light upon a terminological problem emerged in 
relation to the implementation of the EEC directive 93/13 in Italy. Thereby it is 
underlined that the reference to b. f. in the official Italian translation of the di-
rective (“malgrado il requisito della buona fede”) can be interpreted in the 
subjective sense, although in the versions in other languages it appears much 
rather in the objective sense. As the Italian legisator modified the Codice civile 
in order to implement the directive in question in 1996, an even more ambigu-
ous formula (“malgrado la buona fede”) was inserted into the text of the new 
article 1496bis, which can even more lead to a subjective interpretation of the 
category. Although a whole series of Italian civilists called attention to the ter-
minological mistake, instead of the formulas “contrariamente ai precetti della 
buona fede” or “in contrasto con il principio di buona fede” advised by them, 
the strongly criticised previous wording holds on up to the present day.48 In 
relation to this problem Massimo Bianca underlines that the requirements of 
the (objective) b. f. have to be interpreted uniformly in EC-law, and in this re-
spect e. g. the directive 94/14/EC can serve as a guide.49 Others, like Salvatore 
Patti, stress the importance of reaching back to the comm n (above all Roman 
law) fundamentals in terms of history of dogmatics.50 
Within this group of papers Alfredo Mordechai Rabello’s monographic treatise 
has to be mentioned with special emphasis, since it analyses the questions of 
the relations between b. f. and precontractual liability offering an imposing 
comparative law panorama.51 Rabello provides information also about the his-
tory of the development of the distinction between the objective and the sub-
jective b. f.52 
Some authors treat b. f. as a not quite homogeneous category. Elio Casetta 
refers to the fact that the Italian term “buona fede” is being used in various 
senses in Italian law but he analyses the significace of “buona fede” in Italian 
administrative law fundamentally on the basis of a kind of objective monistic 
                                                
48 Also BUSNELLI (cit. fn. 47), vol. I, 236 calls attention to the mistranslation, similarly M. 
BIANCA, Buona fede e diritto privato europeo, vol. I, 201—205. See also BENACCHIO 
(cit. fn. 46), vol. I, 195. S. PATTI, Significato del principio di buona fede e clausole vessato-
rie: uno sguardo all’Europa, vol. III, 59—64 deals specifically with the directive in question. 
A similarly doubtful wording — practically the same mistranslation — in the text of the 
Hungarian Civil Code (§ 209/B, see FÖLDI [cit. fn. 45], vol. II, 97f.) has recently been cor-
rected in Hungary owing to a modification of the Hungarian Civil Code by the Act No. III of 
2006 (see the introductory part of the present review). 
49 BIANCA (cit. fn. 48), vol. I, 205. In the author’s text the number “1994/44/CE” is to be read 
but in the light of the context it must be a printing error. 
50 PATTI (cit. fn. 48), vol. III, 45. 
51 RABELLO (cit. fn. 47), vol. III, 125—227. The author underlines the similarity between the 
Israeli regulation and the objective b. f. in art. 1337 of the Codice civile, see p. 146. 
52 RABELLO (cit. fn. 47), vol. III, 136. 
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view.53 Juan Miquel conceives the b. f. as a more or less homogeneous cate-
gory, regarding it as the antonym of mala fides, and at the same time consider-
ing it as a legal principle.54 
The Austrian authors call attention to the fact that in Austrian law Redlichkeit 
does not mean a subjective state of mind. The Austrian jurists consider 
redlicher Besitzer only that person who is not even guilty of negligenc  in 
holding his possession erroneously as lawful.55 In this way, on the basis of their 
objective monistic concept of b. f. called Redlichkeit, the Austrian lawyers may 
correctly designate as “objective b. f.” the possessor’s erroneous but still 
founded persuasion concerning the lawfulness of his possession.56 It is self-
evident that the “actual” objective b. f., namely the so-called b. f. of the law of 
obligations is closely related to the Redlichkeit of the law of things, as it is 
manifested also terminologically in the ABGB (cp. § 863 [section 2]; § 914).57 
As already referred to above, it is not only the objective monistic system pre-
vailing in Austrian law that diverges from the dualistic approach to b. f. recog-
nised also in respect of terminology58 in German, Swiss, Italian, Dutch and 
Hungarian law, namely for the time being the subjectiv  monistic concept of 
b. f. exists in a number of contemporary legal systems. Be ides the French law 
several Latin American legal systems — developed generally under consider-
able impact of French law59 — e. g. the Brazilian law serve as an example for 
this phenomenon. As Aloísio Surgík points out, “boa-fé” has been tradition-
                                                
53 E. CASETTA, Buona fede e diritto amministrativo, vol. I, 371—387; a similar concept is 
reflected in the paper of C. CONSOLO, La buona fede int rnazionalprocessualistica ed il 
nostro «ricarburato» regolamento di giurisdizione, vol. I, 389—400, as well as of G. 
CUGURRA, La rilevanza della buona fede in tema di accordi ex art. 11 della l. 241 del 1990, 
vol. I, 401—407. 
54 J. MIQUEL, Autonomia del diritto e principio generale della buona fede, vol. II, 467—474. 
55 J. M. RAINER, La buona fede (‘Redlichkeit’) nel diritto austriaco, vol. III, 229—234. 
56 In his paper entitled La buona fede oggettiva nelle regole del ‘Codex Theresianus’, vol. IV, 
439—452, A. VÖLKL apologises, referring to the phrase variatio delectat, because of the 
fact that the “buona fede oggettiva” in the title of his study is not identical with the term ap-
pearing in the title of the proceedings of the conference. The Austrian author deals namely 
with the rules of the acquisition of ownership in good faith a non domino as regulated in the 
Codex Theresianus. In this draft of 1766 the term guter Glaube (VIII, 43) was used in this re-
spect but the b. f. ought to be judged here on the basis of objective crit ria. In this way this 
kind of b. f. does not correspond to the subjective buona fede in terms of the art. 1153 of the 
valid Italian Codice civile but much rather to the buona fede in the art. 534 (sect. 2) and 1189 
of this code. 
57 As it is known, the German technical term Treu und Glauben never occurred in the text of 
the ABGB, as instead of the German term guter Glaube, which has a subjective colour, we 
always find a term of objective character, Redlich(keit) in the text of the Austrian civil code. 
58 Or perhaps only in respect of terminology, see namely fn. 64. 
59 Cp. G. HAMZA, Le développement du droit privé européen. Le rôle de la tradition romaniste 





ally60 a completely subjective criterion in Brazilian civil law but recently a 
tendency has been manifested in the direction of its objectivisation.61 
It is not easy to draw meritory conclusions on the basis of the above survey. It 
is beyond doubt that none of the authors of the nearly 80 papers published in 
the proceedings of the conference in Padua denies the raison d’être of the dis-
tinction between the objective and the subjective b. f.62 It is another matter that 
some authors ignore this distinction, speaking about . f. in an undifferentiated 
way (usually in the objective sense). 
If we accept the dualistic approach to b. f., then the question will arise, whether 
this distinction applies also to the classical Roman law (or at least to Justinian’s 
law) or only to (certain) modern legal systems. Unfortunately it is not known, 
when the word fides took up the meaning ‘belief’ (maybe first in the Christian 
period), and it is not known either, whether the establishment of this new 
                                                
60 The traditional domination of subjective interpretation of b. f. in Brazilian civil law is in 
close connection with the fact — critically evaluated by C. LIMA MARQUES, Das BGB 
und das brasilianische Zivilgesetzbuch von 1916, in: E. Jayme & H.-P. Mansel (hrsg.), Auf 
dem Weg zu einem gemeineuropäischen Privatrecht, Baden-Baden 1997, 90 — that in spite 
of the wide-ranging influence of German law the general clauses of Treu und Glauben in the 
BGB (§§ 157 and 242) had only a limited impact on the Brazilian Código civil of 1916. 
61 SURGÍK (cit. fn. 35), vol. III, 552ff., 566. As the Brazilian author remarks (p. 554), the 
Brazilian code of consumer protection promulgated in 1990 as well as the new Brazilian 
Código civil (entered into force in 2003) show some movement in the direction of the objec-
tivisation of b. f. and in this way of the strengthening of the dualistic concept. This tendency 
is in accordance with the fact that the (new) Portuguese Código civil of 1966 has objectivised 
the b. f. of the law of obligations, too, see SURGÍK (cit. fn35), vol. III, 553f.; cp. J. F. 
SINDE MONTEIRO, Manuel de Andrade und der Einfluß des utschen Bürgerlichen Ge-
setzbuches auf das portugiesische Zivilgesetzbuch von 1966, in: Jayme & Mansel (cit. fn. 
60), 41f. SURGÍK (cit. fn. 35), 565f. advises a more intensive objectivisation of b. f. in re-
spect of Brazilian civil law on the basis of Roman law tradition. Surgík ascertains critically 
that while in the Brazilian law of civil procedure basically the objective b. f. is getting ac-
cross, the Brazilian act about advocates’ ethical code promulgated in 1994 favours the sub-
jective approach to b. f. The Brazilian author refers also to the sources and literature of Ro-
man law, among others to the monograph by K. Z. MÉHÉSZ, Advocatus Romanus, Buenos 
Aires 1971. As to the traditional lack of objective b. f. in the contract law of the South-
American countries, cp. CARDILLI (cit. fn. 32), vol. I, 350ff. The Chilean Código civil 
forms an exception in this respect, so far as there the dualistic approach prevails, cp. 
GUZMÁN (cit. fn. 46), see especially vol. II, 297ff. 
62 Unfortunately not even these volumes devoted to “buona fede oggettiva” inform us, when 
exactly the deliberate distinction between the two aspects of b. f. specified with the attributes 
“objective” and “subjective” was established. The attribute “subjective” was already used by 
the founder of this distinction, WÄCHTER (cit. fn. 25). The formal opposition with these 
specific attributes is undoubtedly encountered by M. HORVAT, Bona fides u razvoja rim-
skoga obveznoga prava, Zagreb 1939, cited by H. KRELLER, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 
2nd ed., Tübingen 1948, p. 118, fn. 1, as well as by R. VOUIN, La bonne foi. Notions et rôles 
en droit privé français, 1939, cited by R. DESGORCES, La bonne foi dans le droit des con-
trats: rôle actuel et perspectives, Paris 1992, 19. 
REMARKS ON THE NOTION OF “BONA FIDES” 69 
meaning had an influence on the legal sense of the b. f. in the ancient times. It 
is possible that it came to the subjectivisation of the b. f. of the law of things 
just in the medieval ius commune. Some romanists (Bignardi, Cardilli, Zannini) 
forewarn in terms of the application of this distinc on, while Talamanca criti-
cises Kaser’s cautious, to some extent objective monistic concept.63 The danger 
of the dualistic approach in research of Roman law c nnot be denied, it can 
namely lead to a schematic interpretation of the sources. 
The dualistic approach is not unproblematic as regards modern law, either. The 
experience of Austrian law shows clearly that not even the possessor’s b. f. 
must necessarily be considered a subjective state of mind. The category of the 
“subjective b. f.” is especially problematic, when in a certain lega system the 
mere “good faith” is not enough for being qualified as a “bona fide” possessor 
but a persuasion based on a high degree of diligence is required. Accordingly, 
the application of the dualistic concept of b. f. is more reasonable in those legal 
systems (e. g. in German and Italian law), where the presumption of good faith 
is only rebuttable by means of evidence of pronounced bad faith or an error due 
to culpa lata. In other terms, the dualism of b. f. accepted in those legal systems 
requiring for the existence of the b. f. the lack of culpa levis (this is the case 
e. g. in Hungary) can be regarded rather as a formal one.64 
If we wished to designate the objective b. f. in modern languages by technical 
terms which do not refer to faith at all, and in this way we spoke e. g. about fair 
dealing only,65 then, on the one hand, we would break away from a long termi-
                                                
63 As regards the propagation of the dualistic approach SANSÓN RODRÍGUEZ (cit. fn. 31), 
vol. III, 355 goes the farthest, so far as this author means that tracing back the objective and 
the subjective b. f. to a unified source would cause confusion in the understanding of these 
two independent legal institutions. 
64 The German and Italian law require for the rebuttal of the presumption of good faith at least 
the evidence of culpa lata, see BGB § 932 (sect. 2: “grobe Fahrlässigkeit”), Codice civile art. 
1147 (sect. 2: “colpa grave”). Therefore in these lega  systems an actual dualism of b. . pre-
vails. As for the strict requirements of b. f. getting across in Hungarian court practice, see 
e. g. the sentence BH 1994: 77. Also in the Draft of a new Civil Code for Hungary (cit. fn. 4) 
there are relevant signs of a fundamentally objectiv  concept of the possessor’s b. f. (see the 
motivation of § 4: 47), in this way the dualistic concept of b. f. preferred explicitly by the 
Draft (see the official motivation of § 5: 77) is rather formal than actual. A similarly strict 
regulation seems to be laid down in Art. 3 (sect. 2) of the Swiss ZGB: “Wer bei der Auf-
merksamkeit, wie sie nach den Umständen von ihm verlangt werden darf, nicht gutgläubig 
sein konnte, ist nicht berechtigt, sich auf den guten Glauben zu berufen”. The French juris-
prudence is less strict again, see F. TERRÉ & PH. SIMLER, Droit civil. Les biens, 6th ed. 
Paris 2002, 469. As to the similar Spanish rules, se GARCÍA SÁNCHEZ (cit. fn. 10), vol. 
III, 230. 
65 For the notion of “fair dealing” see A. E. FARNSWORTH, The concept of fair dealing in 
American law, Roma 1993, 3; MEYER (cit. fn. 22), 79. The absolutely objective expression 
“fair dealing” can be compared with the similarly objective Italian term correttezza as well as 
with the Dutch expression redelijkheid en billijkheid since these expressions do not refer to 





nological tradition, and, on the other hand — assuming that the subjective b. f. 
is invariably called guter Glaube, buona fede, bonne foietc. — we would 
alienate the two types of b. f. too much from each other. 
If we, however, drew the “b. f. of the law of things” as well as the “b. f. of the 
law of obligations” following the Austrian model, namely on the basis of the 
objective monistic concept, into the terminological orbit of fair dealing (Red-
lichkeit), in a certain sense we would re-establish the classi l unity of b. f. 
Nevertheless in the case of such a paradigm shift we would not only have to 
take some terminological problems into account but also the destruction of a 
suggestive dogmatic distinction, which could serve as a highly useful dogmatic 
compass. 
A further meditation on these problems is far beyond the scope of the present 
article. Anyway, it can hardly be doubted that a thorough clarification of the 
complex term of b. f. in terms of legal history and comparative law would be 
necessary. It is also hardly to be doubted that a well-founded regulation on the 
level of both national and European law can be worked out only on the basis of 
appropriate historical-comparative research.66 Obviously in the course of this 
work the consideration of the proceedings of the conference in Padua will be 
more than useful. 
SUMMARY 
Remarks on the Notion of “bona fides” 
ANDRÁS FÖLDI 
The present article has been written on the occasion of a recent amendment of 
the Hungarian Civil Code by the Act No. III of 2006, which aimed among oth-
ers to render unambiguous the distinction between th  good faith in the objec-
tive sense (i.e. Treu und Glauben) and that in the subjective sense (i.e. guter 
Glaube). This modification relied upon the experience that Hungarian jurists 
were often unaware of the difference between the two types of good faith. Mis-
understandings of this kind do not occur in Hungary only but also in Western 
Europe as well as elsewhere. The confusion in question is in connection with 
the traditional dominance of the monistic conception of bona fides determined 
by the Roman law tradition. The dualistic conception of good faith accepted 
                                                
66 Cp. PATTI (cit. fn. 48), vol. III, 64; SURGÍK (cit. fn. 35), vol. III, 566. 
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recently by the Hungarian legislation diffused at about the beginning of the 20th 
century and it led to modification of the legal terminology in several jurisdic-
tions (in this way in the new Dutch Civil Code the technical term redelijkheid 
en billijkheid has been substituted for the traditional term goede trouw every 
time when there reference to the good faith in the obj ctive sense is made). 
The author tries to give a concise survey about the problem, how much the 
dualistic conception of good faith is present in the recent Roman law and civil 
law literature, with special regard to the Proceedings of the international con-
ference held in Padua in 2001 with the title “Il ruolo della buona fede oggettiva 
nell’esperienza giuridica storica e contemporanea”. 
As far as the Roman law literature is concerned, it can be among others ascer-
tained that some romanists (e.g. Bignardi, Cardilli, Zannini) express well-
founded reservations concerning the exaggerated dualism. 
The dualistic conception is somewhat problematical also as regards the modern 
law. Considering the regulation of the Austrian civil law it is not to be denied 
that even the possessor’s good faith can be an objective requirement. The au-
thor concludes that a consequent application of the dualistic conception of good 
faith is possible only in those jurisdictions (e. g. in German and Italian law) in 
which the presumption of good faith is rebuttable only by evidence of pro-
nounced bad faith or an error due to culpa lata. Since under Hungarian law the 
possessor’s good faith has to be free even of culpa levis, the dualism accepted 
recently by the Hungarian legislation means rather a formal dualism than an 
actual one. 
RESÜMEE 
Anmerkungen zum Begriff der „bona fides“ 
ANDRÁS FÖLDI 
Das ungarische Parlament hat mit dem Gesetz Nr. III vom Jahre 2006 einige 
Paragraphen des ung. ZGB vom Jahre 1959 mit der Absicht geändert, um zum 
Ausdruck zu bringen, dass die „bona fides“ (im Weiteren: b. f.) im objektiven 
Sinne (also das Prinzip von Treu und Glauben) nicht identisch mit der b. f. im 
subjektiven Sinne (= guter Glaube) ist. Zur Gesetzesänderung gab jene 
Erfahrung den Anlass, dass die ungarischen Juristen die beiden Begriffe oft 





nicht nur in Ungarn, sondern auch in Westeuropa, und daher natürlich auch 
anderswo zu erfahren. Diese Missverständnisse sind mit er durch die römisch-
rechtliche (dabei vorzugsweise durch die terminologische) Tradition bestimm-
ten Herrschaft der monistischen Auffassung der b. f. verbunden. Die nunmehr 
auch im geltenden ungarischen Recht zum Ausdruck gebrachte dualistische 
Auffassung der b. f. verbreitete sich gegen den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts, 
und hat in anderen europäischen Ländern bereits früher zu terminologischen 
Änderungen de lege lata geführt (man denke etwa an die Einführung des Aus-
drucks „redelijkheid en billijkheid“ für die objektive b. f. im neuen niederländi-
schen BW). 
Der Verfasser der vorliegenden Studie versucht knapp zusammenzufassen, in 
wieweit der erwähnte Dualismus der b. f. in der neuesten römischrechtlichen 
und zivilrechtlichen Literatur, und zwar vor allem in den Akten der in Padua im 
Jahre 2001 mit dem Titel „Il ruolo della buona fede oggettiva nell’esperienza 
giuridica storica e contemporanea“ veranstalteten internationalen Konferenz 
präsent ist. 
Was die römischrechtliche Literatur angeht, stellt der Verfasser unter anderem 
fest, dass einige Römischrechtler (z. B. Bignardi, Cardilli, Zannini) bezüglich 
der Verbreitung der dualistischen Auffassung wohl mit Recht zur Vorsicht 
mahnen. 
Die dualistische Auffassung ist auch angesichts der modernen Rechte nicht 
unbedenklich. Die Erfahrung des österreichischen Rechts zeigt anschaulich, 
dass nicht einmal die b. f. des Besitzers unbedingt im subjektiven Sinne auszu-
legen ist. Der Verfasser kommt zu dem Schluss, dassie folgerichtige Anwen-
dung der dualistischen Auffassung der b. f. nur in denjenigen Rechtssystemen 
möglich ist, in denen (wie z.B. im deutschen BGB oder im italienischen C. c.) 
die Vermutung der Gutgläubigkeit nur durch den Beweis der prononcierten 
Bösgläubigkeit oder eines auf grobe Fahrlässigkeit zurückzuführenden Irrtums 
entkräftet werden kann. Da das ungarische Zivilrecht zum guten Glauben eine 
streng beurteilte Sorgfalt erfordert, ist die im ungarischen Zivilrecht neuerdings 
angenommene dualistische Auffassung der b. f. nicht als Realdualismus, son-
dern vielmehr als Formaldualismus zu betrachten. 
